


David S. Lovejoy

*The Glorious  
Revolution  
in America*

with a new introduction



*The Glorious  
Revolution  
in America*

*Also by David S. Lovejoy*

**Rhode Island Politics and the American  
Revolution, 1760–1776**

David S. Lovejoy

*The Glorious  
Revolution  
in America*

with a new introduction

Wesleyan University Press



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For Elizabeth B.

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## Introduction to the Wesleyan Edition

What do you say about your book the second time around? My late friend and colleague Merrill Jensen, in like circumstance, wrote that it was a temptation to “review the reviewers,” and I suppose it is, except that I don’t believe I could stomach the task or think it would be worth the effort. Not that the reviews were bad, for most were not, although I do remember not finishing one or two that did not seem to have much to do with the book I had written.

More than a dozen busy years have slipped by since *The Glorious Revolution in America* was published, and my recent, present, and prospective scholarly interests are markedly different from what they were in 1972. This may be a good thing, when it comes to introducing a second edition; a change in direction improves perspective and allows a greater objectivity than what I might summon had I continued research and writing in the same period or on a similar topic. I feel now almost as if I were writing an introduction to another person’s book, or, at least, a book several times removed from the materials I read and write about at present.

Until recently, early American historians have paid less attention to the colonists' doings in the latter half of the seventeenth century than they have to other periods, specific events, and significant figures and themes. There are good reasons for this, I am sure, not the least being a continuing excitement among them for the American Revolution, which has never lacked its enthusiasts, and a like attraction to pioneer beginnings in Virginia, Plymouth, and Massachusetts Bay, whose very newness and uniqueness in the New World have always provoked curiosity and wonder. Besides, the almost frantic interest in Puritanism during the last fifty years has absorbed its share, maybe more than its share, of American historians, to say nothing of teachers of literature, whose intellectual, social, and cultural inquiries about early New England have burgeoned at the expense of other regions, periods, and subjects.

Much that has been written about this period, again until recently, stemmed either directly or indirectly from what historians have called the "imperial school" of American history. This approach began in the late nineteenth century and has been taken by such stellar scholars as G. L. Beer, H. L. Osgood, C. M. Andrews, L. A. Harper, and L. H. Gipson. With a few exceptions, these people and their followers seemed close to concluding, with some truth, to be sure, that American colonial history was hardly very American at all, but more a subordinate chapter of English history. Moreover, accompanying their focus on the mother country was an emphasis on mercantilism and colonial policy which separated the historical action even farther from what the colonists were doing. This is no doubt an exaggerated explanation in too few words of the invaluable contribution made by a group of first-rate historians, but it does serve to point out that an exclusively imperial view of early America leaves something missing from the picture, chiefly the hearts and minds, the comings and goings of the people about whom much of the fuss should be made.

Of course, the opposite emphasis, for all its intensive probing into colonists' lives in towns and communities, often suffers from isolation and similarly tells less than the whole story. We have needed a more balanced, a more rounded explanation of the colonists' relationships with the mother country and the course of events in America, and it seems to me this has been forthcoming in the last few years. I like to think that *The Glorious Revolution in America* has played a part in bringing together what at an earlier time seemed like diverse histories of colonists in America and imperial-minded policy makers in the realm.

My interest started some time ago, when I realized that no one had written a book, broadly conceived, about the several rebellions that

took place in the American colonies in 1689. Having already published a work on the American Revolution, I was attracted to the new subject because it promised different materials and ideas, in an earlier period, for study and research. Moreover, it would give me an opportunity to pursue both political and religious ideas, which in the seventeenth century were a good deal less separate than they are today. Here was a crisis, or a series of crises, second only to the revolution of 1776 in the colonies' history, yet there had been little attempt to assess over-all the meaning of these widespread upheavals in the larger context of Anglo-American history.

To achieve a comprehensive view of the colonists' role in the emerging empire, *The Glorious Revolution in America* was written. It asked questions about how these colonists conceived of themselves and what they were doing as settlers in the American wilderness. More specifically, it probed their conceptions of the empire they found taking shape around them, an inquiry particularly pertinent to the years after 1660, when they felt impinged upon by English attempts to centralize both economic and political control in London. In response, colonists articulated a point of view with which there was a surprising measure of agreement, given, of course, the different demands of regional circumstances and the habits and customs of local governments and religions. It was a point of view based primarily on what colonists believed Englishmen's rights ought to be in America, rights laced generously, one must add, with their own self-interested needs as a colonial people.

Once Englishmen turned their backs on James II, a number of colonists rebelled against his governors in America. They claimed their acts were part of a revolution they shared with their cousins at home against arbitrary government and the threat of Catholicism. They fell back on a conception of empire which assumed that colonists in America were guaranteed the same rights as Englishmen who stayed at home. What a government could not do to its people within the realm, they argued, it could not do to Englishmen three thousand miles away. But the rebellions were more complicated than simple political struggles for political rights. Each was also a strike for supremacy by one or more groups of colonists over others in order to satisfy frustrated needs and ambitions whose origins lay deep within the political, social, and economic conditions of each colony. Besides a struggle for principle, for equality of treatment within the empire, the colonists' rebellions of 1689 were violent attempts in New England, New York, and Maryland to exploit, for their own purposes, England's religious and constitutional crisis of 1688.



I like to think, too, that the spate of books published since 1972 on the colonial rebellions and the imperial policies that helped to precipitate them were encouraged, or maybe provoked, by *The Glorious Revolution in America*. I do not think that one can say today that this is still a neglected subject or period in the history of early America. But these new scholarly works are not all of one piece. They vary in geography, purpose, scope, and method. There are some similarities, too. One is an attempt to do justice to both sides of the Atlantic, both sides of the story, to explain the relationship, sometimes even reciprocity, between the planners at home and the doers overseas.

Another similarity is that several are informed, either directly or indirectly (my own included), by Bernard Bailyn's exemplary article "Politics and Social Structure in Virginia," published more than twenty-five years ago.\* The traditional, Old World relationship between economic and social position and political office and power was not easily transferred to New World colonies in the first century of settlement. Unstable political and social structures evolved which thwarted expectations of ambitious colonists and led here and there to outright defiance of provincial officialdom. Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia was one of these provocations, and so, too, Bailyn suggested, were the rebellions of 1689, when the Glorious Revolution provided a timely excuse for aspiring but frustrated colonists to confront obstructive governments.

The most recent book on the subject, Jack M. Sosin's *English America and the Revolution of 1688* (1982), is also the most comprehensive of the new lot, although it focuses only on the years between 1685 and 1696. But lest one think that Sosin believes the causes of rebellion took root only after the accession of James II, the reader should know that this volume is the center panel of an imperial triptych which examines England's colonial administration and the structure of government in America from the Restoration in 1660, through the upheavals of 1688-89, to the first of the Hanoverians in 1715. In rebelling, writes Sosin, colonists were less interested in political principle and a defense of Protestantism than they were in who held power in their own governments under the Crown. It is an ambitious project designed to describe a transatlantic community in which colonial and imperial forces interacted, neither wholly dependent upon the other.

In his book on New England, Philip S. Haffenden plays down the overthrow of Sir Edmund Andros's Dominion of New England and concentrates on what resulted from it. *New England in the English Nation*,

\*First published in *Seventeenth-Century America: Essays in Colonial History*, ed. James Morton Smith (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1959), pp. 90-115, and frequently reprinted.

*1689-1713* (1974) is well described by its title. Massachusetts, presumptuous as usual, took seriously the idea of a shared revolution and tried to translate it into a partnership with England after 1689, interpreting sinews of empire as a kind of interdependence. Its success was limited owing chiefly to English indifference and the French and Indian wars, which not only made a mess of the colony's finances, but in the long run effected unforeseen changes in politics and society. With the exception of the first chapter, Haffenden's book picks up where my volume ends and carries the story of New England's difficulties well into the eighteenth century.

Similarly, Richard R. Johnson thinks the consequences of the rebellions in New England were of greater significance than what he calls the "froth of revolution." Therefore, in his volume, *Adjustment to Empire: The New England Colonies, 1675-1715* (1981), he stresses more the years after 1689 than before, believing that the results laid bases eventually for a "renewed and lasting political and social stability." The adjustment to empire on Massachusetts' part, he writes, helped to delay a final separation for three generations. This is a fine work, derived from admirable scholarship. Some of us, however, who think causes of the rebellions were as important as consequences, maybe more so, are doubtless amused to learn that we have been writing about the "froth of revolution," particularly since the "froth" contained a conception of empire that also helped to lay bases for the course of events in the eighteenth century. But, no hard feelings.

With such emphasis on consequences of the rebellions in America, as two of the books above attest, one might think that Lovejoy has had the last word about what led up to them. Far from it, and one of the new books, which probes into New York City and Leisler's Rebellion, brings into the discussion new techniques of the social historian. This is Thomas J. Archdeacon's *New York City, 1664-1710: Conquest and Change* (1976). Dutchmen, argues Archdeacon, necessarily went along with the English conquest of 1664, but in the next twenty-five years they harbored increasing resentment over displacement both politically and economically and lived lives of not so quiet desperation. Despite outnumbering the English, they experienced a decline in political and social clout which increased tension and bitterness against the ruling elite. When revolution occurred in England, a large number of Dutch, along with other alienated groups, supported its counterpart in New York City under Leisler, hoping that a successful rebellion would assure them of a larger share of the pie. Much of the social and demographic evidence for his argument Archdeacon has culled from a variety of records which allowed him, by sophisticated computer means, to ar-

rive at conclusions not contemplated before. Although the results of this study are pertinent to New York City alone, they pull considerable weight given Manhattan's central role in the government and economy of the province. Still, these conclusions do not apply to other sections of the colony, certainly not to Albany, where Dutchmen overwhelmingly predominated but opposed Leisler. According to Archdeacon, Leisler had no genuine respect for the rights of Englishmen, they being supposedly foreign to his politics. This may be true, but the fact remains that he argued in their behalf and governed in part, at least, according to them until he was hanged for treason by the oligarchy he failed permanently to unseat.

In *The Duke's Province: A Study of New York Politics and Society, 1664-1691* (1977), Robert C. Ritchie has broken out of New York City and explained the course of events in the colony as a whole before and during Leisler's Rebellion. This is a careful study of political development through which the author stresses the complicated relationships between the colony's proprietary and then royal government and the diverse population. Ritchie's emphasis is less on the ethnic dimension so apparent in Archdeacon's book, but he gives due credit to Dutch frustration and resentment as significant ingredients among several, including a fear of Catholicism, that helped to provoke the explosion against James II's ruling elite in 1689.

Lois Green Carr and David William Jordan believe that earlier discussions of John Coode's Rebellion in Maryland (including my own) have confined themselves too much to what went on at the top. In *Maryland's Revolution of Government, 1689-1692* (1974), they have probed admirably into local records, where they found much more continuity in the lives and institutions of Maryland colonists than what the rest of us have described in our concentration upon the assembly's confrontations with the proprietor, the actual overthrow of the Calverts' government, and the hostility between Protestants and Catholics. Digging beneath the provincial level of politics and rebellion, the authors have fashioned a more rounded explanation of Maryland's rebellion than existed before. In doing so they have laid bare what they call the "sources of stability," even during a time of crisis, which contributed in time to workable government and effective social change.

If I were to rewrite *The Glorious Revolution in America*—Clio, please forbid—what, if anything, would I change? What a question! I am not sure I can answer it squarely. If I said, "Not a word," I would appear not only immodest, but also insufferable, a historian who thinks that fourteen years of serious scholarship could not possibly improve upon what he once put into print—improvements derived from new sources,

or old ones overlooked, different methods, a better angle of vision, or a sharper conception of Anglo-American history in this crucial period. If I were methodically to list changes, critics would be quick to charge that I failed to stand by what I had written, that I lacked the courage of my scholarly convictions and was prepared to alter the record without a fight. Well, I plead "neither of the above," but hasten to add that I have learned much from the books mentioned here and from others written recently, parts of which in various ways bear upon the subject. From Sosin, I learned something about the long view of history and the structure of colonial government; from Haffenden, an insight into New England's role, real and imagined, in the English nation. Johnson has taught me the difficulties surrounding New England's adjustment to transatlantic politics in a many-sided empire, and both New England historians impressed upon me the debilitating effects of imperial wars which followed the Revolution. Archdeacon demonstrated the utility of social analysis by statistical techniques, and, more important, their application to a major question about New York City and Leisler's Rebellion. From Ritchie came a lesson in political analysis and the complexities of social and economic diversity in the Duke's province. Carr and Jordan made clear that a historian's tasks are never really complete. Although their book is not "history from the bottom up," it does teach that the records of ordinary people, their courts and probate details, the habits and customs reflected in local institutions, are as valuable to the historian as the struggle between colonists' rights and proprietary power in explaining "Maryland's revolution of government." Imagine living in a world where history, anyone's history, even one's own, was fixed for all time! Clio, again forbid.

Most books have inside stories to them, known only to their authors: writer's block (or cramp) prevented completion; someone stole the copy before it found its way to a publisher; the writing of it became so much a part of the author's life that he or she could not bear to finish it, let alone part with it. We have heard a variety of such stories and probably believe half of them. My own first book, while still in a pre-natal stage of research notes, ended up in a library's trash barrel, victim of an overzealous janitor's compulsion to clear the carrels of rubbish. It was shortly retrieved, I am happy to report, not much the worse for a few hours' close proximity to a half-eaten lunch.

Well, *The Glorious Revolution in America* has its story, too, but one that did not take on real drama until a couple of years after publication, when it began its international career with a bang. Actually, the story did begin a few years earlier.

In the midst of research, I was awarded a Fulbright Lectureship at the University of Aberdeen, Scotland. The year abroad not only acquainted me with a nation and a people I grew to love but also allowed me access to British libraries and made possible a long summer in the Public Record Office and British Library (then called Museum), where the bulk of the manuscript sources for this book were examined. More important, living in Britain for a year (with a month on the Continent) gave my wife and me a new and enlarged view of our own lives against a British and European background, perspective invaluable to us respectively as artist and historian. The happy consequences of the venture have been strung out into a way of life for both of us. A few years later (1971) a research grant took me back to Britain, chiefly to Oxford and the Bodleian Library, and ever since we have divided our lives between Madison, Wisconsin, and a tiny cottage on the edge of the Cotswolds. Now that retirement has set in, we still return to Wisconsin each winter—just like the juncos, and for no better reason.

In 1974 Harper & Row published *The Glorious Revolution* in paperback, and one copy found its way to our Oxfordshire village with bizarre results. The publisher had invited me to submit names of people to whom I would like copies sent as gifts. On my list was the name of a neighbor and friend in Oxfordshire, a retired schoolmaster, who lived across the lane in a handsome stone cottage. I had never seen his name in print, yet assumed I knew it well. But you know how the English swallow the endings of their words, particularly names, and what was really a simple three-syllable surname came to me audibly as two and not quite that. His first name can be spelled in three perfectly good ways, and, of course, I picked one of the two wrong ones.

At precisely this time, the trouble in Northern Ireland took a turn for the worse, and the newspapers were full of it. Some of the terrorism, particularly the plague of letter and package bombs, spread to several English cities, chiefly London and Birmingham. One morning, the Royal Mail delivered to my friend's home a scruffy, unsolicited package from (to him) an unknown publisher, who couldn't spell his first name or get right his last. If he was not close to panic, let's say his apprehension was at a peak, given the circumstances, but he calmed down enough to telephone a friend who was a police constable in a market town some ten miles away. The advice was to bring the package to the police station, where it might be safely examined, and that is what my friend did, gingerly driving the ten miles with the scruffy packet splendidly isolated in the trunk of his car.

You can easily imagine the rest of the story. In short time an expert opened the package from behind a concrete wall with appropriate slits

for well-protected eyes and tools. There, slightly the worse for a six weeks' voyage in the hold of a merchant ship, emerged *The Glorious Revolution in America*, a Harper Torchbook, by my friend's friend, Dave Lovejoy. What an anticlimax! So you see, the book bombed—well, almost bombed—in West Oxfordshire without even a review. And now my story is done. Let's hope that Wesleyan University Press has better luck with its overseas distribution.

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## Acknowledgments

Throughout several years' work upon this book, I have run up a series of debts to both individuals and institutions for help given to me in a variety of ways. It is difficult to know where to begin to thank appropriately these people, libraries, and archives. First on the list is the John Carter Brown Library at Brown University where my research began and where Thomas R. Adams, Librarian, and Jeannette D. Black offered their valuable knowledge and friendly advice. Also at Brown I had frequent aid from David A. Jonah and his assistants at the University Library, then the John Hay. To the staff of the Wisconsin State Historical Society I am indebted for several years of generous help from the librarians, earlier Benton H. Wilcox, now Charles W. Shetler, and particularly Ruth H. Davis, Josephine C. Harper, and Ellen Burke. At Northwestern University I found the same kind assistance, besides welcome encouragement from Professor Gray C. Boyce, then chairman of the History Department there. In Boston I remember with delight the guidance and hospitality of Mr. and Mrs. Leo Flaherty at the Massachusetts Archives, while an old and good friend,



Malcolm Freiberg, made my visit to the Massachusetts Historical Society rewarding and pleasant.

In Great Britain my obligations are many. A Fulbright Lectureship took me to the University of Aberdeen, presenting me an opportunity to continue my research at King's College Library and of a host of new friends with whom I could discuss it. Most of one summer was spent at the Public Record Office in London and the balance at the British Museum, the Library of the Society of Friends, and the Guildhall. At each of these I was cordially received and generously aided.

One of the happy conditions surrounding academic life at the University of Wisconsin has been a substantial granting of research assistance. In my experience this has come in several forms: research leaves and supplemental funds, summer grants, and graduate student assistants. I am particularly grateful to the following scholars, one time or another research assistants, who have made my task easier: Maxine Neustadt Lurie, J. William Frost, Robert M. Bliss, Jr., Laura Eldridge, and John W. Raimo. They have contributed in large and small ways to this study.

Professor William L. Sachse of the University of Wisconsin served in a special capacity by reading several chapters in manuscript and offering some very pertinent suggestions. John C. Rainbolt (once a research assistant) and Theodore B. Lewis, Jr., read bits and pieces here and there and over several years have discussed with me many of the problems dealt with in these pages in ways that were very helpful. James S. Leamon of Bates College kindly lent me his microfilm copy of the Livingston Family Papers in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, New York.

The bulk of the writing was accomplished during the free time offered me by a Guggenheim Fellowship. This generous award allowed me to indulge a one-tracked mind in a single task. Helen Hull typed superbly a large part of the manuscript, winning my admiration and thanks. She was ably assisted by Laura Lehmann and Patricia Haen.

Lastly, I am grateful to my colleagues in the History Department at the University of Wisconsin. Serious teachers and scholars all, they have demonstrated continuously a love of learning and an ability to share it which are the heart of a great university.

D. S. L.

*Madison, Wisconsin*  
*March 1972*

## Abbreviations

A.A.S. <i>Proc.</i>	American Antiquarian Society, <i>Proceedings</i> .
A.H.R.	<i>American Historical Review</i> .
B.M.	British Museum.
BPCol. Wmsbg.	Blathwayt Papers, Colonial Williamsburg.
Cal. Treas. Bks.	<i>Calendar of Treasury Books</i> .
CSPCol.	<i>Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies</i> .
CSPDom.	<i>Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series</i> .
C.O.	Colonial Office Papers, Public Record Office, London.
Col. Recs. N.C.	<i>Colonial Records of North Carolina, 1662–1776</i> (1886–90).
Doc. Hist. N.Y.	<i>The Documentary History of the State of New-York</i> (1849–51).
H.M.C.	Historical Manuscripts Commission.

xxii Abbreviations

M.H.S. <i>Coll.</i>	Massachusetts Historical Society <i>Collections</i> .
M.H.S. <i>Proc.</i>	Massachusetts Historical Society <i>Proceedings</i> .
N.Y. <i>Col. Docs.</i>	<i>Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New-York</i> (1853-87).
P.R.O.	Public Record Office, London.
<i>Recs. Col. Conn.</i>	<i>Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut, 1636-1776</i> (1850-90).
<i>Recs. Col.R.I.</i>	<i>Records of the Colony of Rhode Island, 1636-1792</i> (1856-65).
<i>Recs. Mass. Bay</i>	<i>Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England, 1628-1686</i> (1853-54).
Toppan, ed., <i>Randolph</i>	<i>Edward Randolph: Including His Letters and Official Papers . . . 1676-1703</i> (1898-1909).

NOTE

I have tried to retain as much original spelling, punctuation, and arrangement of letters as possible in words, phrases, and passages quoted. On occasion changes were necessary to promote clarity and to conform to modern types.

To avoid confusion, dates are given according to the Old Style, Julian Calendar which Englishmen used until the middle of the eighteenth century. However, following modern practice, I have begun the new year with January 1 instead of March 25.

## Introduction

This book is about England's American colonies in the latter half of the seventeenth century. It is less a study of colonial policy and navigation acts—although it would seem to begin that way—than about the colonists' responses to both of these, or more generally to the concept of empire which emerged in England after the Restoration in 1660. The focus of the book is upon events and ideas leading up to and climaxing in the colonial rebellions of 1689 which were provoked by both local crises and the Glorious Revolution abroad. It seeks to explain what colonists thought they were doing when they exploited the upheaval in England for their own peculiar purposes as well as to determine the meaning of the English Revolution for them as American colonists.

Historians have spent a good deal of effort already in describing the British colonial system in the seventeenth century. This is a side of the story one blinks at his peril if he wishes to make sense out of the colonial period of American history. We know less of what seventeenth-century colonists thought about themselves and their relation-

ship to England. Such an inquiry is more easily answered for the eighteenth century and particularly for the period just before the American Revolution when colonists were forced by a number of circumstances to argue publicly their conception of empire and explain their connection with Crown and Parliament. In the seventeenth century colonial society was less sophisticated, less mature, less stable, and less reflective about itself and how it regarded its relation to government and people within the realm. Furthermore, communications between colonies and England and between colonists themselves were more primitive. For the most part each colony went along at its own pace, influenced by the nature of its surroundings, conditions, and needs, on the one hand, and by the emerging, yet fitful, colonial policy, on the other. One might conclude from this that colonists thought seriously about themselves and what they were doing only when their assumptions were sharply challenged by specific events as they were in the 1760's and 1770's. One is less likely to think, then, that American colonists in the seventeenth century came to strong conclusions about some of these same problems, since they had had less time to form habits and customs and assumptions about themselves and their connection with the realm. Furthermore, Crown, Parliament, and ministry after the Restoration had only begun to determine how they should implement what few ideas about empire were already current.

There were really very few precedents for an English empire. The rapid settling of new colonies after the Restoration, the regulation of trade and commerce by Parliamentary acts, and the attempt to extend royal control over governments and people were new experiences all around. Of course, colonial policy was based generally on concepts of what we now call mercantilism, but these were not precise in the seventeenth century and meant different things to different people. It was generally conceded in England that colonies existed for the benefit of the mother country, which could only mean some kind of subordination. At the same time colonists insisted that they were Englishmen and therefore ought not to be discriminated against because they happened to live outside the realm. Most charters establishing plantations overseas included statements which colonists believed assured them of the rights of Englishmen even though they might be thousands of miles from England itself.

No one had worked out the laws of empire in the first half of the seventeenth century. Since there were no hard and fixed rules, formulators of policy after the Restoration made them as they went along, and from these a colonial system emerged. At times the rules

handed down by the planners clashed with the colonists' own interests and assumptions—even presumptions—about themselves and how they ought to be treated. New regulations, intensification and centralization of control often created uncertainty in the minds of colonists about what the bases for their settlements were. Besides policy from London, specific demands from proprietors and the Crown often upset local habits and suppositions, which led to further uncertainty. The period between the Restoration and the Glorious Revolution was a time of rapid development in English America, both economic and political, and its effect upon colonists was to force them to seek guarantees and assurances against what they believed were harmful “mutacons.”

In view of the lack of maturity and sophistication in colonial society of the first century, it is surprising that after the Restoration several colonies and many colonists should make very explicit statements about their roles and what they believed were their rights in the emerging empire. No single challenge precipitated these reactions, but an accumulation of events and circumstances in both England and America and several decisions about colonial policy provoked responses which leave the historian no doubt about what colonists were thinking, who they thought they were, and what they regarded as their relationship to government and Englishmen at home. These statements were not all alike, since they were conditioned by local political, economic, and religious differences. Yet, when taken as a whole, they demonstrate that colonists in the latter half of the seventeenth century had come to some hard conclusions about the English empire and the meaning of their life in America.

The writing of early American history has certain built-in hazards peculiar to the subject—as do all historical periods, I suppose, given the nature of history. To American colonial history most significant of these is the American Revolution, that brute presence which, no matter how one interprets it, dominates almost the last half of the eighteenth century and spills many of its ideas over a good part of the nineteenth. Actually, at the outset the Revolution is an advantage to the historian of the earlier period, if for no other reason than it tells him when to stop, for it destroys the principal vehicle on which he hangs his story. But the disadvantages are more complicated and not easily avoided. The worst of these is the unmistakable fact that the colonial period of American history came to a violent end in a bloody revolution. So impressive is this historical truth that it is a frequent temptation, often unconscious, to let it color one's interpretation of, even attitude toward, the course of events, the development of

ideas, which precede it. It is difficult sometimes not to read back into the colonial period conceptions, ways of thinking, even words and phrases of the Revolutionary era which do not belong there. To give the early period this kind of gloss is like reading the end of a detective novel first in order correctly to interpret the intricate plot in light of the conclusion.

I have tried to avoid this danger. To write the history of the colonies with one eye on the Revolution is grossly unfair to the first century and a half of American history. It is a period which richly deserves to be read, understood, and appreciated on its own terms. In writing this book one of the problems was to adhere to my own warning without at the same time bending over backwards and robbing the period of its rightful significance in the overall course of history. When I write that colonists in the 1670's and 1680's reacted to events and ideas sometimes in a fashion similar to that of their grand and great grandchildren in the 1760's and 1770's, am I guilty of reading the sources back to front? I think not. Rather, I conclude from the similarity that a knowledge of the colonists' problems in the seventeenth century is a necessary step toward an understanding of the American Revolution—not the other way around. Further, if colonists of the earlier period expressed certain ideas about empire which their descendants echoed at a later time, I conclude that these ideas are not only old but fundamental to English colonial society and ought to be sought where they originated, in the history of the seventeenth century. This is not special pleading, I think—only an argument for a truer perspective.

What were the circumstances, then, which provoked American colonists after 1660 to settle upon a set of principles which they regarded as fundamental to existence in the empire? What were these principles which defined their role and the rights and liberties they believed they could count on as English subjects living outside the realm? And what connection existed between these assumptions and the rebellions of 1689 which catapulted several colonies into crises second only to the conflict of 1776? These are some of the questions this study seeks to answer.

# 1 “An Affayre of State”: Trade and Commerce

The Restoration of Charles II offered Englishmen splendid opportunities to expand dominions overseas. The settling of new plantations after 1660 was part of an overall economic expansion which, in addition to planting people in America, involved English merchants, courtiers, and promoters in mercantile ventures as diverse as extracting furs from the shores of Hudson's Bay and Negroes from the coast of Africa. Charles's restoration made it possible for an increasing number of interested Englishmen to devote attention to matters of colonies and trade. Around the throne gathered an influential group of noblemen and merchants who helped to shape colonial policy for the next generation. Although this group of well-placed individuals did not share precisely the same ideas about what ought to be done, they agreed generally that colonies in America existed for the benefit of England and for the benefit of those whose money and time were invested in particular colonial schemes and chartered monopolies of trade.



## 2 The Glorious Revolution in America

The names of this group are not hard to find, since they keep popping up on membership lists of chartered companies and as proprietors of colonies in America. Several appear, too, among the committees and councils of trade and plantations which were appointed during the 1660's and 1670's to administer the business of the expanding empire. First on most lists were James, Duke of York, and Prince Rupert, Charles's brother and cousin, respectively, whose associations with the several councils and chartered companies were almost identical. James was also sole proprietor of the colony of New York after its conquest from the Dutch in 1664. Outside the royal family, most prominent among the courtier-promoters were Anthony Ashley Cooper (later Earl of Shaftesbury), William, Earl of Craven, George Monk, Duke of Albemarle, John, Lord Berkeley (brother of Sir William Berkeley, already governor of Virginia and a proprietor of Carolina), Sir George Carteret, and Sir Peter Colleton. These well-established gentlemen were in positions whereby they might not only help to formulate colonial policy, but they might help formulate it according to their own colonial and trading interests.<sup>1</sup>

Within a generation after the Restoration the number of colonies in America doubled. With the exception of New Hampshire, the new colonies—the Carolinas, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania—were proprietary grants, given by the King to favorites and others to whom Charles was obligated in getting back his throne. With these grants went a good deal of power, and although the courtier-promoters probably shied away from the authority boasted of by the Lords Baltimore over Maryland, each charter, Pennsylvania's excepted, fitted the proprietors with considerable control over both government and soil. During the same period the Crown also chartered several trading monopolies, most conspicuous being the Hudson's Bay Company and the Royal African and Royal Fishery companies. Each conferred specific

1. Each of the above individuals was a proprietor of Carolina; a member of both Royal African and Royal Fishery companies; except for Berkeley a charter member of the Hudson's Bay Company; and except for Albemarle a proprietor of the Bahamas (although his son was). Moreover, all were members of Parliament—Colleton not until 1681; Shaftesbury was a Privy Councillor at two different times; all but Colleton served at one time or another on at least one of the committees or councils of trade and plantations (Shaftesbury, Carteret, and Berkeley were on most of them); Craven, Carteret, and Berkeley were original members of the Lords of Trade appointed in 1675; and Berkeley and Carteret were proprietors of New Jersey. In addition, Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, was a member of both councils for trade and plantations in 1660 and a proprietor of Carolina. For this information I am indebted to Professor John C. Rainbolt of the University of Missouri. Formerly a research assistant at the University of Wisconsin, he made a detailed listing of the imperial interests of more than one hundred individuals of the Restoration period.

rights respectively for trade in furs, slaves, and fish in particular areas; charter members and investors included the same group of people who were closely connected with other major economic enterprises of Restoration England.

Along with settling new colonies in America, and as part of the strong economic interest in overseas planting and trade, was a drive to regulate the products and commerce of new and old colonies to England's exclusive advantage. This was attempted by acts of trade and navigation, the laying down of a regulatory policy which was experimental at the outset but by the mid-1670's was fairly fixed in principle and aim. As the value of colonies increased, or seemed to increase, formulators of policy intensified and centralized it, pursuing political as well as economic ends. As a result a number of settlers became convinced that what they had accepted as a necessary part of being colonists was gradually subverting their rights as Englishmen in America.

Englishmen's heed for colonies overseas became more intense after 1660. It was then that circumstances and opportunities seemed to dictate a drive for economic development and expansion. Among some the interest was new; to others, particularly merchants, it was a legacy from the Commonwealth period when a start was made toward a closer watch over colonies and their trade. Probably no one disagreed with the purposes of the Navigation Acts of 1660 and 1663 which stated ideally that

The Trade of the Plantations is, by several Acts of Parliament, confined to England: whereby no Sugar, Tobacco, Cotton wooll, Indico, Ginger, Fustick, or other Dying Wood of the growth or manufacture of the Plantations may bee transported from thence to any other place than England; nor any European Commodities bee carried thither but what shall be shipped in England.<sup>2</sup>

It did not take long for the drafters of Parliamentary acts and those who agreed with them to realize that to state the ideal was only half the battle. There remained the task of implementing it into some kind of system and enforcing fundamental trade regulations before the “Empire of England” would take the shape most people hoped for.

Responsibility for trade and administration of overseas colonies, even for precise knowledge about them, was shuffled from council to committee and back again as it had been under both Commonwealth and Protectorate. Interested persons proffered “Overtures,” suggesting means to gather the strands together toward more uniform control. “Instructions” demanded all manner of facts regarding “intrinsic value and . . . certain condition”; “Inquiries” probed ships and trade,

2. Additional Manuscripts, 15898, ff. 129–30, British Museum.

#### 4 The Glorious Revolution in America

the colonists' "Complaints, their Wants, their Aboundance." The end in sight, according to Thomas Povey, a well-known merchant and adviser in London, was that the whole scheme of things might be thoroughly understood,

whereby a Ballance may be erected for the better ordering and disposing of Trade, and of the growth of the Plantations, that soe, each Place within itself and all of them being as it were made up into one Comonwealth, may by his Matie bee heere governd, and regulated accordingly upon common and equal principles.<sup>3</sup>

By the late 1660's it was apparent that the cure for the expanding problems of colonial regulation was more regulation, and the best way to secure it was through permanent administrative organization with power to order and dispose. Benjamin Worsley, who for twenty years had had his eyes on the colonies and their development and no doubt contributed to the drafting of the Navigation Act of 1660, put his finger on the trouble in 1668 and wrote elaborately "About the Restoring of our Trade & improving ye Concerne of our Plantations." Worsley worked closely with Shaftesbury, and it may be that his "Proposition"<sup>4</sup> was written at Shaftesbury's request, for the latter, besides being a Privy Councillor, had been on all the Committees and Councils of Trade and Plantations since 1660. Like Shaftesbury, Worsley had an expansive view of the problems of colonies and empire, and in most of his suggestions one can find a responsible, if not benevolent, regard for settlers in America. Worsley's "Proposition" came straight to the point when it declared that the plantations in America no longer depended upon England but rather England upon them. Already the nation was incapable of carrying on without the colonies' trade, he reported. As expert as any Englishman in colonial matters, Worsley explained that England's economic position was a good deal different from what it had been forty years earlier when her woolen goods had sold all over the continent. But the trade in manufactures had decayed; now it was the plantations which must fill the gap, and this was fortunate, since trade with colonies "swell[s]" not just one part of the nation but would distribute itself far more equally for the benefit of many than had the earlier exchange with Europe.

A plantation trade not only increased the nation's shipping and treasure, wrote Worsley, but it increased the "Limitts also of o<sup>r</sup> dwelling." It extended the "trade of one Clymatt after another" to England, and,

3. *Ibid.*; Charles M. Andrews, *British Committees, Commissions, and Councils of Trade and Plantations, 1622-1675* (Baltimore, 1908), pp. 68-70, 102-3, 107-8, 123.

4. Shaftesbury Papers, P.R.O. 30/24/49/26, Public Record Office; C. M. Andrews, *The Colonial Period of American History* (4 vols., New Haven, Conn., 1933-38), IV, 58.

what is more, it joined "the Countries themselves and the inheritance of them as well as theire trades" to His Majesty's territories and Dominions. By adding the "inheritance of them," Worsley went on, the nation establishes "a just foundaçon for makeing of them in every age an affayre of State." With this accomplished, how much more important plantations will become than they were in their infancy! In other words, Worsley argued, England could not do much with plantations and their trade unless they were made an "affayre of State." The trades which remained to England could not be left to chance. A major defect in managing the plantations from the very beginning had been that they never were governed under any care, direction, or "regulation." No real order, method, or "Council" existed, and the lack led to serious inconveniences such as "glutts" and "druggs" without standards, limits, or prescription.

Englishmen too easily accepted the cotton and tobacco which the colonies naturally produced and the sugar, ginger, and indigo shown them by the Spaniards. Greater diversity and variety of colonial products, a better balance of commodities, would enrich England and improve employment. To increase the value of colonies, Worsley would encourage widespread movement of people there "so by how much ye more any numbers of psons are incouraged to remove by so much is the name, honour, strength & magnificence of the nation increased." If the newcomers came not from the British Isles, they might come "yet out of New England as ye nursery of all into ye Rest of our plantaçons," and one way to attract them would be to increase the variety of products the colonies produced.

Worsley's "Proposition" was a serious state paper whose suggestions looked forward to a concerted effort for improving the advantages of foreign plantations. And although these advantages would generally accrue to England, they were broad enough to include the people who did the work in America. Whether all Englishmen would agree with Worsley's suggested policies is not easily answered, but as he described them, they must have appeared almost beneficent and hardly arguable. The peopling and cultivating of plantations abroad, he warmly encouraged:

And that it is our wealth here that is properly increased ffor as much alsoe as by the multiplying of the English in those parts more families are provided for & raised to a better Condiçon then if they had staid here[.] And that it is the Empire of England likewise that is hereby rendered the more August[,] formidable and Considerable abroad.

Granted Worsley's goal was ideal, his means of accomplishing it were more practical: there was need for authority; there was need for a council; there was need for power in the council to bring about regula-

tion and a strict account of trade which would move England toward the end he had thoughtfully outlined.

At the time Worsley delivered his "Propositon," responsibility for the colonies fluctuated between two committees of the Privy Council, one for Trade and the other for Plantations. Shaftesbury was a prominent member of both; in fact, since the fall of Clarendon in 1667, he had been a dominant figure in managing colonial affairs.<sup>5</sup> It was under Shaftesbury that an elaborate set of inquiries was sent to the colonies in 1670 which elicited several replies, the most notable being that from Governor Sir William Berkeley of Virginia. An old hand as royal governor, Berkeley wrote frankly about his colony and its difficulties. He singled out for censure the Staple Act of 1663, which prevented colonists from trading directly with Europe, forcing them to exchange only through England. The restriction prevented Virginia from diversifying her economy and relieving herself of the burden of tobacco. What also bothered the governor was that Virginians obeyed the acts of trade, even the most destructive, "whilst the New England men break through and . . . trade to any place that their interest lead them."<sup>6</sup>

Berkeley's complaints did not force Shaftesbury and his council members to recommend a change in trade regulations. However, the first Earl had a reputation for flexibility at points where the acts of trade rubbed hard, and it was this characteristic which separated him from those who followed as overseers of plantation affairs. Shaftesbury was as much a believer in trade regulation as the next man, and he believed, too, in the centralization and intensification of policy which was just beginning, but he continued to lend a leniency to enforcement which was a part of his expansive and balanced view of a colonial system.<sup>7</sup>

The Crown put some of Benjamin Worsley's ideas into effect in 1672 when it commissioned a joint council on Trade and Plantations with Shaftesbury as President. Diarist John Evelyn, a holdover from the Council for Plantations, was included, and the new council made Worsley its secretary and John Locke, still a student at Christ-Church, Oxford, its clerk. (The next year Worsley died and Locke replaced him as secretary of the joint council.) 1672 was a gala year for Shaftesbury, for during it he received his earldom and became Lord

5. E. E. Rich, "The First Earl of Shaftesbury's Colonial Policy," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th ser., VII (London, 1957), 47-70.

6. William W. Hening, ed., *The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia, from the First Session of the Legislature, in the Year 1619* (13 vols., Richmond, Va., Philadelphia, 1819-23), II, 516.

7. See again Rich, "The First Earl of Shaftesbury's Colonial Policy," pp. 47-70.

Chancellor. Despite involvement in the affairs of empire and settlement of colonies, Carolina and the Bahamas, Shaftesbury remained a politician and a good one, as the next decade would show. But political know-how apparently did not acquaint him with Charles II's secret dealings with France and the Treaty of Dover until 1673, at the very peak of his career. Once aware of Charles's deception, he promptly moved into opposition against the King by supporting the Test Act. Straightaway he was dismissed as Lord Chancellor and from the Privy Council, undermining at the same time his commanding position over colonial policy. Owing to Shaftesbury's demise and to the resignation of the Earl of Arlington, Secretary of State, both strong advocates of the joint council, the King revoked the council's commission the next year. Contributing to the dissolution, according to Thomas Povey, was the council's lack of executive authority, which rendered it sometimes slow and ineffective, a weakness Benjamin Worsley earlier had hoped to overcome in favor of decisiveness. The upshot of the change was that responsibility for the affairs of empire shifted to a special committee of the Privy Council which Charles established in 1675, a committee known from that time as the Lords of Trade. The Earl of Shaftesbury was not a member.<sup>8</sup>

The policies of the Lords of Trade reflected a more narrow view of the value of colonies than had the earlier councils under Shaftesbury's leadership. Even before his joint council gave way to the Lords, there appeared during the early 1670's tendencies toward greater restriction and more practical demands upon overseas dominions. The Navigation Acts did not seem to improve much the total value of goods exported from England to the plantations in the 1660's, but the value of products sent to the mother country from the colonies increased by about £121,000 between 1663 and 1669.<sup>9</sup> Doubtless it was the growth in the amount of goods coming to England from America that encouraged members of the House of Commons to demand higher duties on these importations. The House debated an increase in tobacco customs during November 1670. Although some members argued for an additional sixpence duty, three-pence rise was settled upon,

8. E. S. De Beer, ed., *The Diary of John Evelyn* (London, 1959), pp. 554-55; Rich, "The First Earl of Shaftesbury's Colonial Policy"; George L. Beer, *The Old Colonial System, 1660-1754* (2 vols., New York, 1912), I, 253-55; Memorandum by Thomas Povey in Andrews, *British Committees*, p. 112; W. L. Saunders, ed., *Colonial Records of North Carolina* (10 vols., Raleigh, N.C., 1886-90), I, 222-23; W. Noel Sainsbury et al., eds., *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies* (42 vols., London, 1860-1953), 1675-1676, #879; hereafter referred to as CSPCol.; Winfred T. Root, "The Lords of Trade and Plantations, 1675-1696," *American Historical Review*, XXIII (1917), 21-41.

9. Sloane Manuscripts, 2902, f. 118b, B.M.

not without strong words against any increase at all. The arguments of the opposition tell us a great deal about the value to the Crown of the tobacco trade and colonies generally in 1670. Sir John Knight revealed that tobacco alone yielded "seven-score thousand pounds per annum" (£140,000) which made up one-third of the whole of English customs. It afforded Bristol 6,000 tons of shipping, half of the ships belonging to that port. Already the duty was so high and the price so low as to force a good many skippers to leave their tobacco at the Customs House for want of money to settle with the King. Knight argued further that levying the new duty would spoil the trade and the King's revenue with it. And as if colonists did not pay the Crown enough in tobacco customs, Knight reported that the King gained five pounds a head "by every man that goes into the plantations." Whether many members of the Commons had contemplated before the cost of empire to the colonists, it was here revealed in striking terms. Had it not been that the bill included an additional duty on sugar, it doubtless would have become law. But the House of Lords turned thumbs down on any increase in sugar taxes, an indication that West Indian planters had strong representation in the upper house, an advantage the tobacco colonies, Virginia and Maryland, did not enjoy.<sup>10</sup> Fifteen years later, with a new King on the throne, Parliament went out of its way to please him and increased the duty on both tobacco and sugar, providing James II with a tidy new revenue at the colonists' expense.

The Lords of Trade took over the ordering and administering of colonies and trade in 1675. They found circumstances more in their favor than had Shaftesbury's council at its inception three years before. Early in the year of Shaftesbury's fall, Parliament passed the third Navigation Act, which laid the groundwork for a regulatory system easier to come to grips with than that faced by the joint council. The Navigation Acts of 1660 and 1663 were full, sweeping phalanxes of legislation, or at least thought to be when they were enacted. They assumed for England a monopoly of the empire's trade by confining it to English and colonial shipping and earmarking several colonial products for delivery at English ports or those of her colonies and no other place. With only a few exceptions all European goods destined for the plantations had first to go to England, where they were re-shipped aboard English vessels bound for America, leaving in England the profit of exchange and other benefits accruing to a mart and

10. Leo F. Stock, ed., *Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments Respecting North America, 1452-1727* (5 vols., Washington, 1924-41), I, 362-68, 370 n.

staple. In the dozen or so years following enactment of the trade laws, a number of experts had opportunity to see just how they worked and what their strong and weak points were. By the early 1670's most agreed that the system itself was good if it could be adequately enforced. Benjamin Worsley was one among many who admired the scheme but recommended more regulation to overcome the difficulties already apparent.<sup>11</sup>

As the experts and advisers in England scrutinized the acts to see where they might be improved, colonists in America scrutinized them to see where they could avoid them. Despite the fact that the Act of Enumeration (1660) hit the tobacco colonies hardest of all, since restricting tobacco to the English market drove down the price, Governor Berkeley insisted that Virginians toed the mark as far as the laws were concerned. New Englanders were the culprits, he claimed, and there were others who agreed with him. In Massachusetts John Hull, the godly goldsmith, confided to his diary in 1664 that Boston had entertained "near one hundred sail of ships, this year, of ours and strangers, and all laden hence." True, the Staple Act was only a year old at the time, but it is clear that the Bay Colony had not made an auspicious beginning of its career as a member of the empire.<sup>12</sup> Colonists received goods, then, directly from Europe. The Crown felt cheated of its revenue, but there was little to do about it without royal officers on the spot with authority to prevent it.

The second violation of the Acts of Trade was more complicated. New Englanders had been trading with tobacco planters in Virginia and Maryland for years, carrying their tobacco from the Chesapeake to England and ports of Europe. Once Albemarle County was settled in what later became North Carolina, small New England vessels adeptly pierced the difficult reefs and shoals which guarded Albemarle Sound, waters unnavigable for larger ocean-going ships from England. What tobacco the farmers of Albemarle did not send north to Virginia (usually a small amount owing to a local customs duty), they traded to New Englanders upon whom they became dependent for manufactured goods. New England vessels often loaded Chesapeake and Albemarle tobacco, carried it to Boston or another northern port—supposedly satisfying the Act of 1660 which demanded that all colonial tobacco be shipped to England or another colony—and then took it directly to markets in Europe. There they avoided the English customs duty and in the long run probably helped to keep up the price in

11. Worsley, Proposition, Shaftesbury Papers, P.R.O. 30/24/49/26.

12. Hening, ed., *Statutes*, II, 516; "Diary of John Hull," American Antiquarian Society, *Transactions and Collections*, III (1857), 214.



London. Of course, it took a little imagination on the part of New Englanders to argue that the letter of the law was satisfied, but they were up to the challenge. In England the conclusion was that both letter and spirit were violated; the King lost revenue, and Europeans bought tobacco cheaper than Englishmen, who were deprived also of reexporting it to the Continent at a profit.<sup>13</sup>

To eliminate the advantages of the broken voyage, Parliament responded with the Plantation Duty of 1673. The third Navigation Act placed a customs duty on all enumerated articles (one penny per pound on tobacco; five shillings per hundredweight on sugar) carried from one colony to another when the captain had not left bond in England to return them there. Labeled an act "for securing and improving the plantation-trade to Virginia, and other places," the Plantation Duty, it was frankly admitted, was "to turn the course of trade rather than to raise any considerable revenue to His Majesty."<sup>14</sup> To see that the colonists played the game according to the rules, the Commissioners of Customs—a new board, conveniently created just two years earlier as a division of the Treasury—appointed collectors and surveyors in all the southern colonies, including the Islands. New England's turn came later, but in 1673 the emphasis was on the colonies where enumerated articles originated, for the duty was payable where the commodities were loaded. Plantation governors received orders about swearing in the new officers, and the Commissioners of Customs sent elaborate instructions to the collectors, directing them in infinite detail about customs houses, deputies, bonds, keeping accounts, compensation for themselves and the surveyors, and their duty to enforce the other Acts of Trade as well as the new duty.<sup>15</sup>

By late November 1673 the Customs people in London had made

13. *CSPCol.*, 1675–1676, #721, #787, #900; *ibid.*, 1677–1680, #747, #1305; *Col. Recs. N.C.*, I, 232, 242–43, 257, 286–87.

14. 25 Car. II, c. 7, *Statutes of the Realm*, V, 792; Stock, ed., *Proceedings*, I, 398–400, 399 n.; William A. Shaw, ed., *Calendar of Treasury Books, 1660–1718* (32 vols., London, 1904–57), IV, 1672–1675, p. 705. The Plantation Duty was never by itself a moneymaker. From Michaelmas 1676 to Michaelmas 1677 it produced £803 2s. 8d. When William III replaced James II, he received a report informing him that he could count on about £700 per annum from 25 Car. II. Sloane Mss. 2902, f. 117; Harleian Manuscripts, 1898, ff. 1–1b, B.M. For conflicting, or maybe just confusing, figures see Add. Mss. 8133c, f. 237. The Act's significance, of course, although it brought in little revenue, was that when enforced it channeled enumerated goods to England and increased the customs there. See Report of the Commissioners of Customs, C.O. 1/47/103. For other details respecting increase in salaries, lading and bonding rules, etc., under the Act, see Add. Mss. 28089, ff. 30–33; *Cal. Treas. Bks.*, IV, 1672–1675, 126, 437, 456, 659, 705.

15. Instructions to collectors of customs, n.d., Add. Mss., 28089, ff. 30–33; *Cal. Treas. Bks.*, IV, 1672–1675, 424, 427, 451–52, 501, 521, 659, 824; Thomas C. Barrow, *Trade and Empire: The British Customs Service in Colonial America, 1660–1775* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), pp. 12–14.

appointments in all the colonies from Maryland south. In 1674 they added New York and New Jersey to their list.<sup>16</sup> There was some shifting about in the next two or three years, for some appointees refused commissions and some were found incapable of performing the duties. Despite salaries, it may be that the new positions were not attractive to everyone, for collecting customs from shipmasters, upon whom one was often dependent, was probably neither easy nor popular.

There is no doubt that the Plantation Duty was a complicated piece of legislation. Differences of opinion arose about its interpretation on both sides of the Atlantic, and, as one might imagine, decisions were made in England's favor, tightening the law here and there as new questions occurred. A number of New Englanders were sure that once the duties were paid, shipmasters were free to take enumerated goods wherever they pleased. Attorney General Sir William Jones disabused them of this liberty, but there is good reason to believe that for some time afterward they preferred their own interpretation.<sup>17</sup> Three years after the act became effective, colonists learned that even if they paid the duties, shipmasters were obligated to give bonds pledging that they would land enumerated cargoes at another plantation or in England. Confusion about details continued; by 1684 New York traders and shippers were still wondering whether the duty which they paid in Virginia would be refunded if they actually landed the tobacco in England.<sup>18</sup>

London merchants trading to the colonies were among the first to object to the Plantation Act and did so even before it became effective. They pointed out that a good deal of sugar from the British West Indies went first to New England before arriving in England and that this trade was a key to the Islands' economy, since they were dependent upon New England for "boards, timber, pipestaves, horses, and fish," all necessary to carry on their business. Obviously the sugar merchants believed that any interference by means of a new duty would disturb the delicate balance of the sugar trade in which New England played a vital role. Moreover, the London merchants went so far as to point out to several members of Parliament, besides the obvious reasons for objecting to the duty, how impracticable it was

16. *Cal. Treas. Bks.*, IV, 1672-1675, 498, 521; E. B. O'Callaghan and Berthold Fernow, eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New-York* (15 vols., Albany, 1853-87), III, 221-22; hereafter referred to as *N.Y. Col. Docs.*

17. C.O. 5/903, pp. 89, 106; *CSPCol.*, 1675-1676, #798, #814, #900; *ibid.*, 1677-1680, #1305; R. R. Hinman, ed., *Letters from the English Kings and Queens . . . to the Governors of Connecticut* (Hartford, Conn., 1836), pp. 123-26; L. A. Harper, *The English Navigation Laws* (New York, 1939), p. 164.

18. *N.Y. Col. Docs.*, III, 352; *CSPCol.*, 1681-1685, #1915.

"to tax those that had no members in their House."<sup>19</sup> If only for argument's sake, some Englishmen regarded the Plantation Duty of 1673 as a tax upon an unrepresented people. The complaint was not widespread in England.

Objections came from other directions. The farmers of the revenue in Ireland complained of their great losses by war and the "Plantation Act," since the new law discriminated against Ireland as earlier regulations had not.<sup>20</sup> In Boston Increase Mather listed it as one of the "designs" against New England, and Governor Berkeley, who lost no love over Bay colonists, pitied the people there owing to King Philip's War, which had killed off so many, ruined trade, and now this "new tax of 1d. per lb., which my officers rigorously exact from them."<sup>21</sup> When the Royal Commission in 1677 inquired about Virginia's grievances which had led to Bacon's Rebellion, two parishes complained bitterly of the new impost, one emphasizing that it sharply cut into the New England trade upon which their people depended for necessities, even food.<sup>22</sup> Robert Beverley, in his well-known history of Virginia, claimed that the Plantation Duty was one of the last straws which helped bring on Bacon's Rebellion. And there is no doubt that a principal cause of Culpeper's Rebellion in Albemarle County of Carolina the next year was the Plantation Act of 1673. Even more than Virginians, Albemarle settlers depended upon New Englanders to bring them manufactured goods and carry off their tobacco. The penny duty interfered with an established trade, that is, when it was collected, and upset a good many people around Albemarle Sound.<sup>23</sup>

The new act was not an isolated piece of legislation. It was both regarded and enforced in relation to the other acts, particularly the Staple Act of 1663, which outlawed the carrying of European goods to America except through England. The three of them, passed within a period of thirteen years, laid a basis for a system which the new Lords of Trade took over and implemented in 1675. Particularly helpful for getting at the business of enforcement was the Plantation Act, which required a scheme of oaths and bonds and authorized a pin-pointing of collectors and surveyors of the Customs in several colonies.

19. *Ibid.*, 1669-1674, #1059.

20. F. H. Blackburne Daniell, *et al.*, eds., *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic* (96 vols., London, 1865-1924), 1673, 412; hereafter referred to as *CSPDom*.

21. "Diary of Increase Mather," Massachusetts Historical Society, *Proceedings* (1899, 1900), 2d ser., XIII, 340; *CSPCol.*, 1675-1676, #859.

22. *Ibid.*, 1677-1680, #118, #138; *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, III (1895-96), 38, #8.

23. Robert Beverley, *The History and Present State of Virginia*, ed. by Louis B. Wright (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1947), p. 76; *Col. Recs. N.C.*, I, 255, 257, 291-93, 309-11; Bernard Bailyn, *New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge, Mass., 1955), p. 151.

Appointment of customs officers afforded, too, a chance to initiate a system of patronage which would be useful to the Crown, although at the very outset, several appointees were more loyal to their colonial friends than they were to King and empire.

As a committee of the Privy Council, the Lords of Trade had a good deal more authority and prestige than the earlier councils. Once organized in the early spring of 1675, it lost no time getting to work. Several months before the King had announced its establishment to the plantation governors, the Lords commenced to make inquiries in England about colonial trade and on the basis of these inquiries to make decisions and stricter policy. Most of the questions were about New England, where as yet no customs officers resided and where weaknesses in the system were prevalent. Within a year after the first of May 1675 the Lords of Trade did more to tighten and centralize control over the colonies and their trade than ever had been attempted before or would be again until the last Navigation Act of 1696.<sup>24</sup>

The new program took several forms. A Royal Proclamation sent to all colonies in November demanded obedience to all the Acts of Trade and emphasized both the Staple Act of 1663 and the Plantation Duty recently enacted. Moreover, it commanded all governors and civil and military officers to assist the customs people in enforcing the acts and in their other duties. The Crown and the Commissioners of Customs dispatched circular letters to the governors outlining procedures and enjoining obedience. To the two oaths already demanded of governors before commencing their duties, a third was added for the "due execution of the Navigation Act." Hinged to this was the obligation to return copies of bonds taken respecting the Plantation Duty, whereby shipmasters pledged to return enumerated goods to England. And then they demanded a pledge from each governor that he would send home lists of ships which loaded these goods in his colony. Since the passing of the Act, the Lords had learned from the Customs House of "very loose and imperfect return of these bonds," and, for that matter, the lists of ships, some governors having sent home very few and a number none at all. In a third circular letter, dispatched in April 1676, the Lords described themselves as "very strict inquisitors" who would exact from governors "frequent and punctual account."<sup>25</sup>

If the experience of Richard Pidgeon was any precedent, colonists'

24. *CSPCol.*, 1675-1676, #231, #546, II, #679; W. T. Root, "The Lords of Trade and Plantations," *A.H.R.*, XXIII (1917), 20-41.

25. *CSPCol.*, 1675-1676, #713, #872, #875, #879, #880; *Cal. Treas. Bks.*, IV, 1672-1675, 852; *CSPDom.*, 1675-1676, p. 505; W. L. Grant and James Munro, eds., *Acts of the Privy Council of England, Colonial Series, 1613-1783* (6 vols., London, 1908-12), I, #1078, #1080, #1171; hereafter referred to as *Acts of P.C., Col. Ser.*

ships and cargoes when seized could be tried in Admiralty Courts without juries or the common law, for that was the fate of his *Golden Phoenix* when he landed tobacco in Ireland, contrary to the acts. His was not a common occurrence, but Lord Treasurer Danby determined in March 1676 that "the matter is regularly within the cognisance of that Court and fit to be left there." This was an innovation hardly foreseen by the colonists, for courts of common law with juries ordinarily tried violations of the Acts of Trade in England and would continue to do so.<sup>26</sup> Just one month after Captain Pidgeon ran up against a Court of Admiralty, the Lords of Trade, still smarting under repeated reports of trade violations, resolved that instructions be given to captains of His Majesty's frigates "to seize offenders against the acts."<sup>27</sup> And yet in New England, which seemed to be the source of the trouble, there were as yet no customs collectors, nor were the governors specifically sworn to uphold the acts.

There were two reasons for this. First, New Englanders grew none of the enumerated commodities, and at the outset there seemed to be no need to fix officers there, since the collectors in the Islands and Albemarle, Virginia, and Maryland, where sugar and tobacco grew, would exact the duties before they allowed New England ship captains to clear their ports. Reports to the Lords of Trade increasingly pointed out that this was not the way things worked, for once the duties were paid, too often the goods went to Europe, where the captains took on cargoes which they sold in the colonies, violating the Acts of Trade both coming and going. The second reason grew out of an embarrassing apprehension on the part of the policymakers that New Englanders might resist customs collectors forced upon them. New England had won a noisy reputation for independence in the minds of most Englishmen at the time. Both Shaftesbury's council and the Lords of Trade found New England—and when they said New England, they meant Massachusetts—a sticky problem which, according to those who pushed the new policy, the government had not solved but ought to immediately.

The evidence which reached the ears of the Lords of Trade was overwhelming. New Englanders' trade was open to all parts of Europe. One report claimed that they looked upon themselves as a "free State." An English merchants' petition to the King prayed they be compelled to obey the laws, since the volume of foreign goods taken to the colonies had made New England the "great mart and staple" of the empire. The mercers and silk weavers of London told the Privy

26. *Cal. Treas. Bks.*, V, pt. I, 1676–1679, 170.

27. *CSPCol.*, 1675–1676, #898.

Council that they feared ruin by the New Englanders who easily carried silks and stuffs directly from France and Italy. The list of violations grew larger as time went on; so, too, did the estimate of money the Crown lost in customs while the trade continued.<sup>28</sup>

In January and February 1676 talk centered on the lack of customs officers in New England, and in March Lord Treasurer Danby made preparations for administering oaths to the governors there. In April the Lords of Trade called in the merchants who traded with Massachusetts and queried them about the abuses there. Some were "shy to unfold the mystery," while others affected ignorance, but the majority laid bare the widespread exchange of enumerated articles for European goods which they commonly sold in the colonies 20 percent cheaper than could the fair traders. The frequency and magnitude of the trade forced the Lords to waive any tenderness for the Bay Colony's feelings. They immediately recommended that commissions be sent the governors to swear execution of the acts; that the Commissioners of Customs appoint officers in New England to collect the duties; *and*, "in case of refusal to admit them, the other plantations be forbidden to trade with them." Lastly, the Lords asked for the assistance of the Royal Navy in seizing offenders.<sup>29</sup> Other means were discussed for dealing with the New Englanders, besides settling customs officers among them, one being that the King commission all men-of-war and any merchant ships which would accept commissions to seize any colonial vessels found in the straits trading contrary to the law and bring them to the Admiralty. Apparent, too, was the desire among some to levy a duty in all the other colonies "upon any goods from New England wch may bee had from England." Included in these suggestions was a remark which implied less apprehension about New England's independence than had obtained earlier if the government clamped down upon it. New Englanders could revolt to no other nation because they would "have not plantations to trade withall."<sup>30</sup>

It was probably Edward Randolph, more than any other individual, who brought home to the Lords of Trade the most critical view of New England. Randolph came to Boston in June 1676 ostensibly on proprietary business in New Hampshire but largely to spy out the success or lack of success of the Acts of Trade in Massachusetts. For the next year or so his letters and reports not only confirmed what the Lords of Trade already believed, but once back in London, he sug-

28. Capt. Wyborne's Account, 1673, *ibid.*, #721, #787, #797, #881.

29. *Ibid.*, #898; CSPDom., 1675-1676, 574; *Cal. Treas. Bks.*, V, pt. I, 1676-1679, 170.

30. Add. Mss., 28089, f. 3.

gested that the colony's sins were even greater than they appeared. A long talk with Governor John Leverett had demonstrated to Randolph that the King and Parliament obliged the people of Massachusetts "in nothing but what consists with the interest of that colony." They took no notice of the Acts of Trade and "have engrossed the greatest part of the West India trade whereby his Majesty is damaged in his customs above £100,000 yearly and this kingdom much more."<sup>31</sup>

But the King delayed appointing a customs officer in New England until the middle of 1677, a move which, it was explained, "for some weighty reasons hath been deferred intil now." The delay is puzzling. One might think the cause was King Philip's War, which had tied up New Englanders in a struggle against annihilation, but subsequent events discount such solicitude. Probably the delay stemmed from the ruckus caused by Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia, which upset most Englishmen who had anything to do with plantation affairs since it sharply reduced the customs. It was late spring 1678 before the Treasury and Customs Commissioners finally got around to naming an officer to collect the Plantation Duties throughout New England. At a salary of £100 a year and power to appoint deputies where he pleased, he arrived in Boston the next year, and Edward Randolph was his name.<sup>32</sup>

The historian can be grateful that the new Lords of Trade continued the practice of sending "Inquiries" to the plantation governors. The answers tell us a good deal about the colonies, although there is the suspicion that the governors sometimes reported what they believed the Lords of Trade wanted to hear rather than the facts as they stood. Nevertheless, responses to the "Inquiries" of 1675-1676—sent to New England in 1679—are an excellent source of all kinds of information: economic, political, religious, military, demographic, and, on the whole, descriptive. To the question, "What obstructions do you find to the improvement of the trade and navigation of the plantations within your government?" the Lords received striking answers, one or two of which may have come as surprises. Jamaica avoided a direct answer but suggested encouragement of trade with Ireland. Lord Baltimore came to the point respecting Maryland and remarked that the greatest

31. *Ibid.*, ff. 6-30; Robert N. Toppan and Alfred T. Goodrick, eds., *Edward Randolph; Including His Letters and Official Papers . . . 1676-1703* (7 vols., Boston, 1898-1909) II, 216-21, 265-68; Michael C. Hall, *Edward Randolph and the American Colonies, 1676-1703* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1960), *passim*; *CSPCol.*, 1675-1676, #1067, pp. 463-68.

32. *Cal. Treas. Bks.*, V, pt. I, 1676-1679, 688-89; *ibid.*, pt. II, 1676-1679, 983-84, 1023, 1089; Hall, *Randolph*, pp. 45 ff. Randolph was not first named for the job but was finally settled upon in 1678.